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CHAPTER

9

THE STATE OF EXTERNAL LAW'S EFFECT
ON THE ARBITRATION PROCESS
Editor's Note: Ted St. Antoine, and Bob Vercruysse and his
colleague, Gary Fealk, supplied two formal papers that lead off this
chapter in the Proceedings. Their papers are followed by Marilyn
Teitelbaum's presentation made at the meeting. The Academy
acknowledges a special debt to Ms. Teitelbaum because she served
as a last-minute replacement, after the original panelist had to
cancel because of illness.

I.

EXTERNAL LAW IN .ARBITRATION: HARD-BOILED,
SoFT-BOILED, AND SuNNY-SrnE UP
THEODORE].

ST.

ANTOINE*

Thirty-seven years ago Bernie Meltzer and the late Bob Howlett
squared off at our annual meeting in a classic confrontation on an
issue that refuses to die. What should an arbitrator do when there
is a seemingly irreconcilable conflict between a provision of a
collective bargaining agreement and the dictates of external law?
Professor Meltzer was the hard-boiled logician. Arbitrators' proper
domain is the parties' contract, said he, and we "should respect the
agreement and ignore the law" when the two diverge. 1 Howlett
took the softer, more accommodating approach. He reasoned that
"every agreement incorporates all applicable law" and so arbitrators "should render decisions ... based on both contract language
and law. "2 A year later Dick Mittenthal joined the fray, along with
this interloper. Dick preferred to look on the bright, practical side

*President, 1999-2000, National Academy of Arbitrators; James E. & Sarah A. Degan
Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan.
1Meltzer, Ruminations about ldeolog;y, Law, and Labor Arbitration, in The Arbitrator, the
NLRB, and the Courts, Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting, National Academy of
Arbitrators, ed.Jones (BNABooks 1967), 1, 19.
'Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the Courts, in The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and the
Courts, Proceedings of the 20th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators, ed.
Jones (BNA Books 1967), 67, 83, 85.
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and not follow either Meltzer or Howlett to their rigidly logical
conclusions. Staking out a "middle ground," he would allow an
arbitral award to "permit conduct forbidden by law but ... not require
conduct forbidden by law." 3 After paying all due respect to
Mittenthal's thoughtful analysis, neither Meltzer nor Howlett
budged an inch from his original position. 4 My contribution as
discussant was to side with Meltzer' shard-boiled stance, and to give
priority to the contract rather than to the law. 5
This paper is going to discuss what a cross-section of today's
Academy members think about this persisting problem. As we shall
see, they tend to accept the Meltzer/St. Antoine thesis in theorybut when the going gets tough, most of them move over into Dick
Mittenthal's corner, if notBobHowlett's. Ifl must declare a winner
in this 40-year marathon, I believe it is Dick who gets the palm for
the most widely accepted compromise solution. Before setting
forth the results of my little survey, however, I shall briefly set forth
my reasons for supporting the hard-line Meltzer position.
I start with two basic premises. First, most labor arbitrators in this
country are not public tribunals. They are private individuals
jointly selected by a union and an employer to tell those parties
what their collective bargaining agreement means. Their authority
comes entirely from the parties' commission and they have no
power beyond that. Second, labor arbitrators do not, in a technical
sense, enforce contracts; courts enforce contracts. The arbitrator's
role is to provide a definitive interpretation or reading of the
contract, which a court is obligated to accept absent arbitrator
fraud, an exceeding of authority, or a denial of due process in the
arbitration. It is often overlooked that in the leading case of
Enterprise Wheel, 6 the U.S. Supreme Court seems to have accepted
this approach. The Court stated flatly that an arbitral award is
legitimate only if it "draws its essence" from the labor agreement,
and arbitrators exceed the scope of the submission if they base

•~itte_nthal, The Ri?le of Law in Arbitration, in Developments in American and Foreign
Arbitration, Proceedmgs of the 21st Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators, ed.
Rehmus (BNA Books 1968), 42, 50 (emphasis in the original).
4
Meltz<;r and f:Iowl~tt, Rejoinder~ (two separate papers), in Developments in American
and Foreign Arbitration, Proceedmgs of the 21st Annual Meeting National Academy of
Arbitrators, ed. Rehmus (BNABooks 1968), 58, 64.
'
5
St: Antoine, Discussion, in Developments in American and Foreign Arbitration, Proceedmgs of the 21st Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators, ed. Rehm us (BNA
Books 1968), 75.
6
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 ( 1960).
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their decision on their view of the "requirements of enacted
legislation. "7
I agree with Dick Mittenthal that "[a]rbitrators derive their
powers from the contract, not from the [National Labor Relations]
Board and not from federal law. "8 I further agree with Dick, for this
and other reasons, that Bob Howlett was wrong in thinking that all
contracts incorporate all law and thus entitle arbitrators to choose
the law over the contract when the two conflict. 9 But I disagree with
Dick's qualification that arbitrators should not require conduct they
deem contrary to law. Here I believe Meltzer had the better of the
argument in saying there is no logical basis for Dick's distinction. 10
The parties have granted the arbitrator the authority to apply
external law or they haven't. If they haven't, it makes no sense to
say an arbitrator may permit conduct contrary to law but not require
it. Meltzer also observes that in criticizing Bob Howlett's position,
Dick cites the Enterprise Wheel statement I have quoted above, but
"fails to explain why his formula does not run afoul of the Justice's
unqualified limitation on arbitral authority." 11
There is a highly practical reason that, in the event of an
irreconcilable conflict between the contract and the law, I believe
an arbitrator should follow the contract and not the law. In many
instances the law is simply not that clear or settled. For me the
classic example is Teamsters v. United States [T.l.M.E.-D. C.]. 12 The
U.S. Supreme Court held that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
was not retroactive and did not affect established seniority rights,
and thus the perpetuation of seniority credits acquired under preAct discriminatory conditions did not constitute a present violation of the statute. In so ruling, the Court overturned an unbroken
string of contrary holdings by six courts of appeals in over 30 cases
and the dicta of two other courts of appeals. 13 Arbitrators who had
refused before the Teamsters decision to require compliance with
clear seniority provisions on the grounds they violated Title VII
would have been wrong not only under the contract but also under
the law.

7

/d. at 597.
Mittenthal, supra note 3, at 53.
/d. at 52.
10
Meltzer, supra note 4, at 60.
11
/d. at 60 n.5.
12
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
13
/d. at 378-79 (Marshall,]., dissenting,joined by Brennan,].).

8

9
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Now I must play something of a spoilsport. Despite all the fun this
issue of external law has provided Academy members and guests
over the years, it may all boil down to a tempest in a teapot.
Everyone seems to agree, including the Supreme Court, 14 that an
arbitrator may look to the law for guidance in interpreting a
contractual provision. That of course is especially true if the
language of the agreement closely tracks statutory phraseology,
thus deliberately inviting resort to judicial or agency rulings as an
aid to contract interpretation. Furthermore, if there are ambiguities in a contract, one possible interpretation most likely being
lawful and another most likely not, an arbitrator can certainly
indulge in the presumption that the parties intended their agreement to be construed consistent with the law so as to preserve its
validity. Finally, the union and the employer may agree, either in
the contract itself or in the submission agreement, that the arbitrator is to rule on statutory as well as contractual issues, or is to
interpret the contract in the light of the relevant statutes as
construed by the courts or administrative agencies. When all the
situations are identified in which arbitrators may, consistentwith the
contract, comply with the dictates of statutes or other legal authorities, we have probably accounted for the overwhelming majority of
arbitrations involving external law. Truly irreconcilabk conflicts
between contract and law must be relatively rare.
Let me add a couple of practical suggestions for both party
representatives and arbitrators. By now the potential for clashes
between contractual and legal requirements should be well known,
alongwith the differing arbitrator reactions to them. Why shouldn't
the parties spell out, either in the contracts themselves or at least
in their submission agreements, how they wish the arbitrator to
handle such conflicts? In the absence of such guidance, an arbitrator confronted with what may be a direct conflict between law and
contract might ask the party representatives directly how they wish
him or her to respond. I have felt I should ask on a few occasions,
and the answers and reasons have varied widely. Examples follow:
• Mr. Arbitrator, we know there is a possible conflict, and we
disagree with each other about both the contract and the law.
All we want from you is a final and binding interpretation of
the contract. If that still leaves us at odds, we '11 go to court for
a final resolution of the legal question.
14

Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1960).
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• Mr. Arbitrator, the last thing we want is to prolong this dispute, or to have you issue an unenforceable award. Ifyou need
to take the law into account to decide this matter finally, by all
means do so. Otherwise, we know an award contrary to law
will be no more enforceable than a contract contrary to law.
Fortunately for me, both parties have always agreed on either my
considering the law or my ignoring it. If they had disagreed, I would
not have felt authorized to consider it.
To determine how today's Academy members would deal with
these questions, I conducted a survey in early 2004. I asked the
approximately 240 members who are on our unofficial e-mail list
to complete the questionnaire that is attached as Appendix A to
this paper. A total of 52 members responded and I am deeply
appreciative of their cooperation. The full results are tabulated in
the Appendix. I cautioned respondents to assume the questions
related to arbitrations only in private sector employment, to avoid
any special problems related to arbitration in the public sector. A
Canadian arbitrator also noted that the Supreme Court of Canada
requires arbitrators to apply and enforce all relevant statutory law.
A majority of the responding arbitrators are prepared to cite
external law in their decisions, at least under certain conditions.
About half will do so only if the parties themselves have interjected
legal authorities into the dispute through briefs or argument.
Around 30 percent will invoke external law "when it seems especially pertinent" even if the parties haven't cited legal authorities.
Reliance on external law seemed most appropriate for some
arbitrators when the issue was "discrimination" or of course when
the contract plainly incorporated the law. Arbitrators opposed to
citing external law declared that labor arbitration "is the creation
of the parties" and their intent should prevail. Those relying on
external law believed that the parties want "finality, consistency,
and legal enforceability."
A solid majority of the respondents-almost 60 percent-took
much of the steam out of this great debate by saying they "seldom
feel required to deal with the issue of contract versus law because
I believe the vast majority of contracts should and can be interpreted as consistent with the law." That reflects a sentiment I have
long held. But there surely are cases where a conflict cannot be
avoided and this is where I found our members' alignments with
the Meltzer, Howlett, or Mittenthal positions, almost 40 years after
their initial enunciation, most revealing and to my mind somewhat
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paradoxical. In the event of an irreconcilable conflict, almost twice
as many arbitrators said they would follow the contract, unless the
parties instructed them otherwise, as said they would follow the law.
That would be in accord with the Meltzer rather than the Howlett
approach. Despite the vote generally favoring the contract over the
law, however, another clear majority-again almost 60 percentstated they would not order a party to violate external law as part of
their award. While Meltzer and I might rail that this was illogical,
the result plainly amounts to a triumph of what I call Dick
Mittenthal's sunny-side-up view: The contract, and logic, prevailuntil it really hurts!
There was considerable divergence of opinion about whether
arbitrators would ask the parties for their positions on the use of
external law when there appears to be a conflict between law and
contract. The largest single group, but well short of a majority,
would not specifically ask but would decide for themselves, after
taking into account any views expressed by the parties in briefs or
oral argument. Less than a quarter would ask whether they should
consider only the contract or external law as well. At one point in
the survey, 35 percent said they had no basis "for invoking external
law against the contract unless both parties authorize it." Somewhat confusingly, however, in answering another question, a mere
15 percent agreed with me that they would apply external law only
if both parties accepted that course. 15 But more than a quarter
agreed they would feel bound in the framing of the award if both
parties were in agreement on giving primacy to either the contract
or the law.
As one might expect, arbitrators on both sides of the contract
versus law debate had good reasons for their respective positions.
Those favoring the contract declared that their authority derives
from the parties and the parties' contract, and absent the parties'
accord, arbitrators have no basis for invoking external law against
the contract. They also emphasized that the law is often unclear
and unsettled, and that unless the parties agree otherwise, arbitrators should provide a definitive interpretation of the contract and
leave issues of external law to the courts. Interestingly, although

15
1 _may not have been sufficiently clear, however, that I was inquiring here only about
~onjlicts be~een contract and law rather than the use of external law as a guide to the
mterpretauon of, or the resolution of ambiguities in, the contract. I too would simply
assume the parties' assent in the latter situation.
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more arbitrators had earlier stated they would follow the contract
instead of the law if there was an irreconcilable conflict, the only
reason for a position one way or the other that garnered the
support of a majority of all respondents was that the parties should
be presumed to want their contract to be interpreted consistent
with external law. Other favored reasons for a pro-law approach
were that the collective agreement almost invariably provides that
an arbitral award should be "final and binding" and that it is
counterproductive to order a party to take action in violation of
external law.
In addition to answering my specific questions, respondents
offered a variety of worthwhile observations. A number of arbitrators commented that external law is now an integral component of
the arbitration process, and that it would be futile to resist this
development. There was disagreement over whether this would
adversely affect nonlawyer arbitrators. Some believed well-qualified nonlawyers would have no difficulty handling the sort of
statutory issue that is typical in arbitration. Several others insisted
that in any event "our province is contract, not law." Some examples of other provocative and often contrasting remarks are as
follows:
• "Importing external law into arbitration has furthered its 'legalization,' mostly because lawyers often lose sight of the parties' relationship."
• "Clinging to the old ways will result in a perceived 'illegalization' of arbitration, to the general detriment of the institution."
• "I prefer to limit myself to contract interpretation but the courts
are pushing more and more legal questions into arbitration."
A group of th?ughtful and experienced professionals have
demonstrated a wide range of attitudes on the perennial question
oflawversus contract. Overall, most seem to say that they will follow
the contract and not the law if a conflict is unavoidable. But a larger
number of res~ondents support rationales that would favor the
law. An~ when It comes to the ultimate test, namely, whether one
should issue an aw~rd ordering action that seems contrary to
ext~rn~l la~, t~e maJ_ority say, with perhaps more practicality than
logic: No. Like _Dick Mittenthal, they would permit, but not
reqmre, conduct In violation of law. Perhaps it simply appears
more unseemly for arbitrators to get directly involved in unlawful
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conduct than for them merely to let such conduct stand because
the contract calls for it.
I shall now turn for a few words about how external law most
forcefully affects the arbitration process. That is when the courts
are asked to enforce an arbitration agreement or an arbitral award.
In AT&T Technologjes v. Communications Workers, 16 the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed and refined four principles set forth in the
famed 1960 Steelworkers Trilogy 17 concerning the judicial enforcement of an executory agreement to arbitrate:
• Arbitration is a matter of contract and a party need not arbitrate unless it has so agreed.
• The court, not the arbitrator, is to decide whether a party has
agreed to arbitrate, unless the parties clearly provide otherwise.
• The arbitrator, not the court, is to decide the claim under the
collective bargaining agreement, even if the claim appears
frivolous to the court.
• If the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability. Arbitration should not be denied
unless the clause cannot be interpreted as covering the dispute. Doubts are resolved in favor of coverage.
Some parties, most often employers, balk at the application of
these standards in certain extreme cases. That is an understandable human reaction but both logic and policy are on the side of
the Court. A typical arbitration clause covers "all disputes arising
under the contract," with rare exclusions, and is not limited to
"meritorious" or "nonfrivolous" claims. And as a practical matter,
even the arbitration of frivolous claims may serve a therapeutic
function, clearing the air and letting the parties get on with their
business.

16

475 U.S. 643 (1986).
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav.
Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise "Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
The first two cases dealt with the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate; Enterprise dealt
with the enforcement of an arbitral award once issued. Generally, Enterprise held that a
court should not review the merits of an award and should confine itself to such questions
as whether there was any fraud or corruption, denial of due process, or exceeding of the
arbitrator's commission.
17
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Probably the most controversial issue of recent years has been
the authority of a court to set aside an arbitration award on the
grounds it violates "public policy." In Paperworkerv. Misco, Inc., 18 the
Fifth Circuit had refused to enforce an arbitrator's reinstatement
of an employee whose job was operating a dangerous paper-cutting
machine, and whose car had been found to contain marijuana
while in the company parking lot. The Supreme Court reversed,
declaring that "as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing
or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not
suffice to overturn his decision. " 19 The Court naturally recognized
the general common law doctrine that a contract will not be
enforced if it violates the law or public policy. But it cautioned that
there must be '"some explicit public policy' that is 'well defined
and dominant, and is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and
legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed
public interests. "' 20
Not all the lower courts seemed willing to accept this message.
The Supreme Court had to reinforce the lesson in Eastern Associated
Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers District 17. 21 This time an arbitrator
had ordered the reinstatement of a truck driver who had twice
tested positive for marijuana. A three-months' suspension was
substituted for the discharge, however, and the employee had to
undergo drug treatment and testing and to accept "last chance"
terms in his reinstatement. The employer argued that the award
was contrary to public policy but the Court disagreed. It first
emphasized that the award should be treated as the equivalent of
an agreement by the parties on the meaning of ''.just cause." It then
applied Misco, pointing out that the relevant federal statute and
Department of Transportation regulations contained both antidrug and rehabilitation provisions for safety-sensitive positions
and nothing that would specifically prohibit the grievant's reemployment. Justices Scalia and Thomas, concurring, would have
gone even further. They would refuse to enforce an agreement or
award only on the grounds it violated some positive law, and not
any other "public policy. "22

18

484 U.S. 29 (1987).
/d. at 38.
/d. at 43, quoting from WR. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
21
531 U.S. 57 (2000).
22 /d. at 68.
19

20
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One should think that with a unanimous Supreme Court sustaining the award in Eastern Associated Coal, and with two of the most
conservative Justices its most ardent champions, the final stake
would have been driven through the heart of nebulous public
policy challenges to arbitration. But the objectors have shown
remarkable resilience over the years, and there is still available the
claim that an award does not "draw its essence" from the collective
bargaining agreement or that the arbitrator has attempted to
"dispense his own brand of industrial justice." 23
Nonetheless, a review of courts of appeals' decisions over the
past year is encouraging that the Supreme Court's words have
finally got through to the lower courts. Thus, courts enforced
arbitration of claims that an employer violated an agreement with
a union concerning the parties' conduct during an organizing
campaign, 24 that an employer had improperly made unilateral
changes in job categories so it could fill vacancies without regard
to contract procedures, 25 and that a truck driver had been discharged uajustly for urinating in public. 26 During the same period
arbitral awards were sustained that reinstated a monitor at a
natural gas facility who left his post for more than three hours to
look for a missing and possibly injured son, 27 that conditionally
reinstated an employee who forged customers' names to public
assistance checks, 28 and that granted a union $1.6 million in
damages because an employer failed to pay union-scale wages to
nonunion workers performing off-site sheet metal work in violation of a disincentive provision in a project labor agreement. 29
Courts have also been ready to uphold arbitrators' clarification of
awards following their initial issuance. 30

23
Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597-98. For a pessimistic view of the likelihood of keeping
the courts' hands off labor arbitration awards, see Feller, Presidential Address: Bye-Bye
Trilogy, HelloArbitration!in Arbitration 1993: Arbitration and the Changing World ofWork,
Proceedings of the 46th Annual Meeting, National Academy of Arbitrators, ed. Gruenberg
(BNA Books 1994) 1, 9-14.
24
SEIU v. St. Vincent's Medical Center, 344 F.3d 977 (9th Cir. 2003). See also SEIU v. NYU
Hov:ital Center, 343 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 2003).
2
PaperWorkers Local 5-857 v. Conoco, Inc., 320 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 2003).
26
Teamsters Local 767 v. Albertson's Distribution, Inc., 331 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2003).
27
MidAmerican Energy Co. v. /BEW Local 499, 345 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2003).
'"Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc. v. UFCW Local 791, 268 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D. R.I. 2003).
29
Eisenmann Corp. v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 24, 323 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 2003).
'°See, e.g., Sterling China Co. v. Glass & Pottery Workers Local 24, 357 F.3d 546 (6th Cir.
2004); Brown v. WITCO, 340 F.3d 209 (5th Cir. 2003).
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Over the past several decades a heated debate has raged over socalled "mandatory arbitration." An employer makes it a condition
of employment for individual employees that all workplace disputes must be taken to arbitration for final resolution rather than
be made the subject of an employee's court suit. Or, more rarely,
the employer seeks to apply the arbitration clause in a union
contract to the same end. The purpose, of course, is to avoid the
time, cost, and presumably more damaging remedies resulting
from trial by judge or jury. One effect is to put even sensitive civil
rights claims in the hands of arbitrators instead of the courts. Most
scholars, at least at the outset, strongly condemned these arrangements. 31 The National Academy of Arbitrators also adopted a
statement opposing the practice. 32
Nonetheless, in Gilmerv. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 33 the U.S.
Supreme Court approved a mandatory arbitration agreement
between an employer and an individual employee as a bar to a
court suit by the employee, claiming age discrimination. The
theoretical arguments against such an agreement are very powerful. Congress, or some other legislative body, has prohibited
various types of employment discrimination and has prescribed
certain procedures for the vindication of those statutory rights.
The specified procedures, sometimes including the right to a jury
trial, may be almost as important as the substantive rights themselves. No employer, acting either alone or in conjunction with a
union, should be able to force an employee to waive the statutorily
provided forum and procedures as the price of getting or keeping
a job. Conditioning employment on the surrender of statutory
entitlements would seem a blatant affront to public policy.

"See, e.g:, Grodin, Arbitration ofEmplnyment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine and Policy in the
Wake of Gilmer, 14 Hofstra Lab. LJ. 1 (1996); Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual
Emplnyment Rights: The Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 Denver U. L. Rev. 1017 (1996).
But cf Estreicher, Pre-dispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Emplnyment Claims, 72 N .Y. U. L.
Rev. 1182 (1997).
"!'lati!mal Academy of Arbitrators, Statement on Condition of Empluyment Agreements, in
Arbitration 1997: The Next Fifty Years, Proceedings of the 50th Annual Meeting, National
Academy of Arbitrators, ed. Najita (BNA Books 1998), 312.
"500 U.S. 20 (1991). Cf Alexanderv. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (employee
who lost arbitration under union contract could later sue for alleged racial discriminati!m). The Court has since held that an individual's agreement to arbitrate employment
~1sput~s does not preclude the EEOC from seeking victim-specific relief in court,
mcludmg reinstatement, back pay, and damages. EEOC v. Wa•(jle House Inc. 534 U.S. 279
(2002).
~J
'
'
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Yet facts often trump theory. Highly pragmatic considerations
indicate that the ordinary rank-and-file worker may be better off
with the actuality of arbitration, even of the mandatory variety,
than with the beguiling, but often illusory, possibility ofa court suit.
Experienced plaintiffs' attorneys have estimated that only about 5
percent of the individuals with an employment claim who seek help
from the private bar are able to obtain counsel. 34 Of course, some
of those who are rejected will not have meritorious claims. But
others will be workers whose potential dollar recovery will simply
notjustify the investment of the time and money of an experienced
lawyer in preparing a court action. For those individuals, the
cheaper, simpler process of arbitration is the most feasible recourse. It will cost a lawyer far less time and effort to take a case to
arbitration; at worst, claimants can represent themselves or be
represented by laypersons in this much less formal and intimidating forum.
Several studies show that employees actually prevail more often
in arbitration than in court. The American Arbitration Association
in one study found a winning rate of 63 percent for arbitral
claimants. 35 In a much-criticized system operated by the securities
industry, employees still prevailed 55 percent of the time, according to the U.S. Genera1AccountingOffice. 36 Bycontrast, claimants'
success rates in separate surveys of federal court and EEOC cases
were only 14.9 percent and 16.8 percent, respectively. 37 Even if the
latter figures are somewhat skewed because they may omit pretrial
settlements, the relative attractiveness of arbitration for claimants
cannot be denied. 38 As might be expected, successful plaintiffs
obtain larger awards from judges orjuries. But claimants as a group
recover more in arbitration. 39 All these statistics reflect the situation before the American Bar Association's Due Process Protocol40

34
Maltby, Private justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 Colum. Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 29, 58 (1998).
5
' Id. at 46.
""Id. at 50.
37
Id. at 49.
'"Cf Green, Debunking the Myth ofEmployer Advantage from Using Mandatory Arbitration for
Discrimination Claims, 31 Rutgers LJ. 399, 418-62 (2000).
39
Maltby, supra note 34, at 54.
4'Yfask Force on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment, A Due Process Protocol for
Mediation and Arbitration ofStatutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship, Disp.
Re~ol..J.,,Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 37. The task Force consisted of management, union, and
plamtJffs attorneys from the A13A and the National Employment Lawyers Association, and
representatives of the American Arbitration Association, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the National Academy of Arbitrators, and the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution.
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was adopted, when many flawed systems were in existence. Arbitration procedures should be even more favorable for employees
now. In short, for me the key is not the mandatory nature of the
agreement but the accessibility and fairness of the arbitration
system in actual operation.
As an arbitrator, I am quite satisfied with the current relationship
between arbitration and external law. Arbitrators can ordinarily
take public law into account in their treatment of collective
agreements. The parties generally wish their contracts to be interpreted so as to preserve their validity. In the relatively rare instance
of irreconcilable conflicts between contract and law, the parties
have the right to determine which takes priority in the arbitral
process. Being a hard-boiled purist in these matters, I would
require both parties, expressly or impliedly, to authorize me to
override the contract on the basis of law. Otherwise I would follow
the contract, which I consider the sole source of the arbitrator's
power in the private sector, even if that meant directing a party to
take action I might consider unlawful. Other arbitrators will differ,
especially on that last point. I find their sunny-side-up approach
illogical, but maybe it is more practical. The courts, of course, will
have the final say on what can be enforced.
I am happy to report that since Misco and Eastern Associated Coa~
the lower federal courts seem to have fallen into line with the
Supreme Court's teachings on the enforcement of both executory
agreements to arbitrate and arbitral awards. Ajudge's personal
notions of public policy, not closely related to statutes or decisional
law, should not be the basis for refusing to enforce an otherwise
valid award. Finally, the much-maligned mandatory arbitration
agreement is apparently turning out to be a blessing in disguise for
rank-and-file employees. They can get their cases heard and they
generally do better in arbitration than they would in court. My
hope is that employers will find that the employees' success rate is
outweighed by the savings in time, litigation costs, and psychic wear
and tear on everyone, which have long been the advantages of
arbitration over court suits.
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A

QUESTIONNAIRE ON EXTERNAL LAW
1. In handling grievances, arbitrators often deal with issues in
which contract rights may overlap statutory or other legal rights,
e.g., anti-union discrimination, "status" discrimination (based on
race, sex, age, disability, etc.). In such situations, what comes
closest to reflecting your general approach (please assume all
these cases involve private sector employment)?:
_8_1 rarely if ever cite external legal authorities, such as
statutes, court decisions, etc., even if the parties have cited them.
_2LI would cite external legal authorities if but only if a party
interjected them into the dispute.
-1.fi_I cite external law when it seems especially pertinent or
persuasive on a particular point, even if the parties haven't cited
legal authorities.
_ _Other (please explain). Individual arbitrators said they
would cite external law "if it was controlling"; if the parties had
"alluded to the law," even without citing specific authorities; if
"discrimination" was the issue or the contract plainly incorporated
the law.
Optional-My reasons for such treatment of external law in
arbitration decisions are:
Arbitrators opposed to citing external law declared that "labor
arbitration is the creation of the parties"; the parties' intent should
prevail; any use of external is "up to the parties"; the arbitrator "has
no authority outside the contract"; and the job is "to apply the CBA,
not to provide a comprehensive legal analysis." Several arbitrators
who rely on external law stressed that "the parties want finality,
consistency, and legal enforceability," with one adding that it's
basic to contract law to void illegal bargains. Two arbitrators would
answer a losing party who raised legal arguments. A couple of
arbitrators mentioned the importance of writing an opinion that
would "withstand judicial scrutiny." Another would advise counsel
in the corridor that the award "would not be in conflict with the
law." A Canadian pointed out that use of external law is mandated
by the courts in Canada.
2. Arbitrators may encounter cases where there seems a conflict
between a statute or other external law and the provisions of the
parties' collective bargaining agreement. This of course presents
the classic Howlett-Meltzer-Mittenthal debate of the late '60s (NAA
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Proceedings, vols. 20 & 21). What is your general approach (check
all that apply)?:
-12._I ask the parties whether they wish me to consider only the
contract, or external law as well.
__U:_I consider myself bound as to the AWARD if both parties
agree on one course or the other.
_4_But I may express my own views in the OPINION if I
disagree with the parties-or even recuse myself if I feel strongly.
-1.'Z___If the parties disagree on whether I should apply external
law, I decide for myself what course to follow.
_8_1 apply external law only if both parties agree on that
course .
....22._I do not specifically ask for the parties' views on the
question ofexternal law but decide for myselfwhat course to follow,
taking into account any position the parties may have expressed in
briefs or oral argument.
_fill_! seldom feel required to deal with the issue of contract
versus law because I believe the vast majority of contracts should
and can be interpreted as consistent with the law.
-2.L_In the event of an IRRECONCILABLE conflict between
the contract and the law, I would follow the contract unless the
parties instructed me otherwise.
_fill_Although I would generally follow the contract in the
preceding situation, I would NOT order a party to violate
external law as part of my Award.
_l2_In the event of an IRRECONCILABLE conflict between
the contract and the law, I would follow the law.
_ _Other positions (please explain). At least half a dozen
arbitrators commented that they had never encountered a situation where they felt there was an "irreconcilable" conflict between
the contract and the law. Two stated their position would depend
on just how clear the law was. One arbitrator would tell the parties,
if there was a perceived conflict, that he would make every effort to
reconcile and apply both contract and law.
My reasons for the above positions are (check all that apply):
__lB_My only authority derives from the parties and their contract and I have no basis for invoking external law against
the contract unless both parties authorize it.
_li_The courts are the proper forum to resolve conflicts
between the contract and external law; my expertise relates primarily to contract interpretation, not external law.
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---1'.Z__The law is often unclear or unsettled; unless the parties
agree otherwise, they are entitled to the arbitrator's definitive
interpretation of the contract standing alone before they decide
on whether to sue over issues of external law.
_fill_The parties should be presumed to want their collective
bargaining agreement, like other contracts, to be interpreted and
applied consistent with external law.
--2Q_The collective bargaining agreement almost invariably
provides that the arbitrator's award is to be "final and binding";
it will not be such if the arbitrator's decision flies in the face of
external law.
---1'.Z__The public policy that places arbitration in such a preferred position is based to a large extent on the desire for an early,
nonlitigated resolution of disputes; that policy is flouted if arbitrators decide cases contrary to law.
---2.Llt is futile, counterproductive, and an open invitation to
further litigation for an arbitrator to order a party to take action that
is a violation of external law.
_ _Other (please explain). One arbitrator cited his decision
in Duraloy, 100 LA 1166, 1172 ( 1993), which reasoned that absent
the parties' authorization, or the incorporation of law into the
contract, an arbitrator's reliance on external law would be improper because it would constitute adding to, or subtracting from,
the contract. (What might the Howlett group, which follows the
law, say it is doing?) Others emphasized that the integrity of the
arbitral process presupposes obedience to law; a decision contrary
to law frustrates the process by being unenforceable; and an illegal
award does not constitute an appropriate remedy. A Canadian
noted that the Supreme Court of Canada requires arbitrators to
apply and enforce all relevant statutory law.
3. Please add any general comments you may have about the
whole topic of the effect of external law on labor arbitration. Is it,
for example, another factor furthering an unhealthy, excessive
"legalization" of the arbitral process? Has it or has it not reduced
the acceptability of highly qualified arbitrators who don't hold law
degrees--or deterred nonlawyers from entering the field? What
about such heretofore supposed prized attributes of arbitration as
speed, cheapness, and relative informality? Etc., etc., etc.
A number of arbitrators declared that external law is now an
integral component of the arbitration process, that statutory issues
must often be addressed, and that it would be futile to resist this
development. Law is said to be "a seamless part of the practice."
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There were differing views about whether this adversely affects
nonlawyer arbitrators. Some thought well-qualified nonlawyers
were as capable as lawyers to resolve the sort of statutory dispute
that is typical in arbitration. Even those who felt lawyers may be
favored believe many nonstatutory, purely contractual issues still
remain for nonlawyers to handle. And several arbitrators were
ready to sound the traditional theme that "our province is contract,
not law."
Those responding were reassuring that closer adherence to law
should not destroy arbitration's attractive informality, and one
remarked that good briefing on the law ought to prevent problems
of an undue lengthening of the process.
A few arbitrators worried that the increasing complexity (discovery, etc.), and accompanying high cost, of employment arbitration
could spill over into labor arbitration. This might be especially
hurtful, they feared, for smaller unions and employers.
Miscellaneous comments or admonitions follow (some have
been reworded):
• "The parties' contract is the jurisdictional basis [for arbitration] but interpretation in light of the law is a basic principle."
• "The parties intend to follow the law whenever possible."
• "Importing external law into arbitration has furthered its 'legalization,' mostly because lawyers often lose sight of the parties' relationship."
• "Clinging to the old ways will result in a perceived 'illegalization' of arbitration, to the general detriment of the institution."
• "It's dangerous to enter an area that the parties haven't briefed
or argued."
• "Applying external law promotes the 'speed, cheapness, and
relative informality of arbitration' by expediting a final resolution of the dispute."
• "I prefer to limit myself to contract interpretation but the courts
are pushing more and more legal questions into arbitration."
• "Don't put arbitration in disrepute by issuing awards contrary
to law."
• "Lower courts are too ready to overturn an arbitration decision despite the 'final and binding' language of the contract."

